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Professor jay Silver's criticism of the reform proposals put forward in Brian Tamanaha's
book Failing Law Schools displays some characteristic weaknesses of American legal
academic culture. these weaknesses include a tendency to make bold assertions about
the value of legal scholarship and the effectiveness of law school pedagogy, while
at the same time providing no support for these assertions beyond a willingness to
repeat self-congratulatory platitudes about who professors are and what we do.
'the high costs for our students of the current scholarly expectations at American
law schools are clear. What is not clear is whether those costs are worth incurring.
Simply asserting that they are because the typical publications of American law faculty
supposedly provide valuable critiques of the legal system that have a beneficial effect
on the system's operation does not constitute an argument. Likewise, neither do
similarly ungrounded assertions that traditional law school pedagogy teaches law
students how to think.
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Paul Campos is Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
60 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 214 (2013)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN T ROD U CT ION ............................................................................................................. 2 16
I. M ARKET FAILURES ............................................................................................. 217
II. TENURED FACULTY AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ................................................... 219
III. Two TIERS OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE SOCRATIC METHOD .................... 221
C ON CLU SION ................................................................................................................ 224
215
60 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 214 (2013)
INTRODUCTION
Brian Tamanaha's Failing Law Schools argues that American law schools
now cost far too much to attend, given long-term trends in the employment
market for people with law degrees.1 For example, according to statistics com-
piled regarding the national graduating class of 2011, only 55 percent of gradu-
ates had found long-term, full-time jobs requiring bar admission nine months
after graduation. He proposes several different methods of reform, some of
which involve loosening regulatory restrictions that inhibit the creation of alterna-
tives to the largely homogenous model of legal education prevalent in the United
States today.2
Professor Jay Sterling Silver criticizes Tamanaha's proposals.' Silver be-
lieves the proposals will lead to a stratified hierarchy of law schools, with only a
few elite institutions continuing to provide the high-quality pedagogical experi-
ence that Silver assumes everyone now enjoys by attending law schools accredited
by the American Bar Association (ABA). Silver argues that Tamanaha's reforms
would force the vast majority of law schools to provide their students a "cut-rate
education,"4 much to the detriment of the students' future clients.
It would be harsh, but fair, to point out that Silver's criticism of Tamanaha
works as a kind of performative refutation of Silver's central claim, which is that
the traditional model of legal education teaches people how to think. If how to
think means how to think in a way that allows one to argue in a coherent and
convincing manner, then Silver's piece does no credit to that model. On the oth-
er hand, if how to think means believing that making a string of unsubstantiated
and often facially incredible assertions will sway readers to one's point of view,
then legal education has, at least in Professor Silver's particular case, succeeded all
too well.
Professor Silver's response contains a number of unsubstantiated assertions.
This Essay addresses three of them: the current cost of legal education is an accu-
rate reflection of the real cost of producing adequately trained lawyers, the schol-
arship produced by tenured law faculty has enormously beneficial effects on the
operation of the legal system, and Tamanaha's reform proposals would stratify
legal education. These claims illustrate how, in my view, the crisis of the Ameri-
1. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, at xi (2012).
2. Id. at 172-81.
3. Jay Sterling Silver, The Case Against Tamanaha's Motel 6 Model ofLegal Education, 60 UCLA




can law school is in large part a product of the tendency of law school faculty to
indulge in platitudinous self-congratulation.
I. MARKET FAILURES
Before turning to those assertions, we should note that Silver's reply to the
thesis of Failing Law Schools is oddly nonresponsive. Assume for the purposes of
argument that Silver is correct that the high cost of contemporary American legal
education is unavoidable if we are to produce minimally competent lawyers. It
would seem to follow that, given Tamanaha's analysis, minimally competent
lawyers can be produced only at a cost that leaves very large numbers-indeed ar-
guably a solid majority-of law graduates unable to secure a positive long-term
economic return on their educational investment.6
Silver gives no hint that he disagrees with Tamanaha's conclusions regard-
ing the consequences of making law degrees costly to obtain. This seemingly
commits Silver to arguing for heavily subsidizing legal education. Silver, howev-
er, ignores this and other practical consequences of his implicit concession of the
main point of Tamanaha's book, which is that the economic structure of legal
education now results in many, if not most, new law degrees having negative net
present value for their holders This concession allows Silver to confine himself
to the more congenial task of arguing that the current high salaries and low
teaching loads of law faculty have enormous benefits for society as a whole8-
5. Id. at 54-59.
6. See Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
177, 201 (2012).
7. In fact, legal education in America is heavily subsidized by the federal government at both the
front and the back end. At the front end, federal student loans allow students admitted to law
schools to borrow the fiill cost of attendance as determined by those schools. These loans are
subject to no actuarial controls and in effect require taxpayers to loan sums to law students that in
many cases would be unavailable from private credit markets. At the back end, federal loans are
eligible for income-based repayment, a federal government program that allows debtors subject to
a partial financial hardship to pay less than what they would otherwise owe on their debt. Both
forms of subsidy are crucial to the economic structure of contemporary legal education. For
information on income-based repayment, see FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/
repay-loans/understand/plans/ncome-based (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
8. Silver, supra note 3, at 55 ("Stripping law faculties of the time to contemplate the weaknesses
of the law and the injustices of the legal system, and discarding the tenure necessary to instill
meaning in the words 'academic freedom,' reduces a vital social resource to a cog in the
current structures of power. Under the guise of fiscal management, law professors willing to
take on the wielders of power in the public and private sectors would be silenced.").
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although apparently not the sort of benefits that can be captured adequately by
market transactions.9
Speaking of markets, Silver's argument begins with a discussion of the chang-
ing market for law school admissions. Conceding Tamanaha's main point once
again, Silver acknowledges that legal education now resembles the housing and
mortgage derivatives markets, which inflated into speculative financial bubbles
before bursting so spectacularly five years ago. According to Silver, "the law
school bubble is about to burst in a perfect storm of market correction."'" Silver
points out that applications to law school are down sharply over the past two
years; he argues that this will lead to law schools relaxing their admissions stand-
ards, which will lead to lower bar passage rates, which in turn will depress law
school applications even further.1
What is missing from this analysis is any acknowledgment that the housing
crisis and the law school bubble are each textbook examples of marketfailure. In
each case, a purportedly rational and efficient market was severely distorted by,
among other things, poor information, which in turn was largely a product of
self-dealing. Indeed, the analogy between the housing and law school bubbles is
in many respects almost eerie, with the US. News & World Report "employment
percentages" playing the role of Standard & Poor's and Moodys bond ratings,
which gave sterling investment grades to mortgage derivatives that were in fact
certain to default sooner rather than later.
1 2
Nor does Silver acknowledge that market failures of this sort are not self-
correcting. In the case of the law school bubble, applications are collapsing in no
small part because of a concerted campaign to force law schools to start providing
something resembling transparent information regarding initial employment and
9. Law school faculty salaries have roughly doubled in real terms over the past thirty years, while
teaching loads have dedined by 50 percent or more at many schools. See Campos, supra note
6, at 186, 191.
10. Silver, supra note 3, at 53.
11. As of January 25, 2013, the total number of applicants to ABA-accredited law schools had
dedined 20.4 percent compared to the same time last year. If this trend holds, approximately
54,000 people will apply for admission to the 2013 class, compared to 87,900 applicants in the
2010 dass-a three-year dedine of 38.6 percent. See Three-Year ABA Volume Comparison,
LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/three-year-
volume.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
12. On the housing bubble and the mortgage derivatives market, see generally MICHAEL LEVIS, THE
BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). Law schools inflated employment
percentages by counting all forms of employment-legal, nonlegal, nonprofessional, part-time, and
temporary-equally. Thus, an associate at a big law firm and a barista working ten hours per week
were both counted as employed for the purposes of a school's advertised graduate employment rate.
In addition, salary data were often reported without any caveats regarding the (often very low)
percentage of graduates whose salaries were represented by that data.
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salary outcomes for graduates.13 The publication of Failing Law Schools was an
important moment in this campaign. The book emphasizes that one particularly
crucial way in which law schools have failed is that, for many years, potential law
students have relied on misleading employment and salary data provided by the
schools when deciding whether to enroll. 4
Over the past two years, the law school transparency movement has largely
succeeded in making the following information much more accessible to poten-
tial law students: (1) At present, ABA-accredited law schools graduate approxi-
mately two people for every available legal job; (2) The large majority of such jobs
pay $60,000 per year or less-often far less; and (3) Law students are graduating
with an average of more than $150,000 in educational debt.1 These facts, which
are central to Tamanaha's argument that the economics of American legal edu-
cation are broken, did not become generally known through a perfect storm of
market correction but rather via the efforts of a committed cadre of reformers,
among whom Tamanaha has been acknowledged as the most important and in-
fluential.
1 6
In short, Silver does not dispute Tamanaha's diagnosis. Instead he recom-
mends the budgetary equivalent of a couple of aspirin and some bed rest: Law
schools must "tighten their belts, reduc[e] the size of incoming classes, cut[] ad-
ministrative costs, and forgo[] hiring for a while," 7 rather than the more aggres-
sive treatments Failing Law Schools advocates.
II. TENURED FACULTYAND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Silver's objection to Tamanaha's recommendation that there ought to be
more variety among law schools, with some deemphasizing tenured faculty and
faculty scholarship and/or offering two-year J.D. programs, is that such changes
would harm both legal scholarship and law school pedagogy." According to Sil-
ver, these changes would produce inferior lawyers, who in turn would inadvert-
ently harm the interests of those clients who could not afford to purchase legal
services from the graduates of traditional law schools. 9
13. See Rachel M. Zahorsky Kyle McEntee Challenges Law Schools to Come Clean, ABAJ. (Sept. 19,2012,
9:00AM),http://www.abajournaLcom/legalrebels/artide/kyle mcentee scourge of the status quo.
14. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 71-74.
15. See Campos, supra note 6, at 199-206.
16. The January 2013 issue of National Jurist Magazine chose Tamanaha as the most influential
person in American legal education. Jack Crittenden & Christina Thomas, 2012 The Most
Influential People in LegalEducation, NAT'LJURIST, Jan. 2013, at 22, 23.
17. Silver, supra note 3, at 54.
18. Id. at 56-59.
19. Id. at 58.
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Silver argues that tenure and low teaching loads are necessary for the pro-
duction of valuable legal scholarship:
As a wise colleague pointed out to me not long ago, "The legal profes-
soriate develops suggestions for law in the common interest that are not
produced by the powerful lobbies generating laws today. If we are
reduced to teaching automatons, we would leave the field to those
who buy their spokespersons." Stripping law faculties of the time to
contemplate the weaknesses of the law and the injustices of the legal
system, and discarding the tenure necessary to instill meaning in the
words "academic freedom," reduces a vital social resource to a cog in
the current structures of power. Under the guise of fiscal manage-
ment, law professors willing to take on the wielders of power in the
public and private sectors would be silenced.20
This argument makes several assumptions: (1) That the production of val-
uable critiques of the legal system is a common outcome of the current publica-
tion requirements for tenure-track faculty at American law schools; (2) That
seriously suboptimal amounts of these valuable critiques of the legal system
would be generated by law schools if Tamanaha's reforms were adopted; and (3)
That these valuable critiques of the legal system constitute an important practi-
cal counterweight to the invidious effect self-interested actors have on the legal
system.
These three assumptions strike me as, respectively, implausible, incredible,
and utterly fantastic. Professor Silver might well reply that they don't strike him
that way and that in his view the scholarship being emitted by American law
faculties at an ever- accelerating rate21 is in fact "a vital social resource
' '22
_
presumably because such scholarship provides, via some unspecified mecha-
nism, socially efficacious critiques of the nation's power structure.
Still, under current circumstances the burden of persuasion in such a debate
falls on Silver. After all, Silver does not dispute that legal scholarship has become
very expensive to produce and that this expense is having various bad conse-
quences for law graduates. In other words, legal scholarship produced by tenured
faculty at American law schools plays a significant role in driving up the cost of
law degrees. What is not clear is whether those costs are worth incurring. Simp-
ly asserting that the costs are worth incurring because the typical publications of
American law faculty provide valuable critiques of the legal system and that these
20. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).
21. I estimate that tenure-track faculty published approximately 1650 law review articles in 1970 and
nearly 10,000 in 2010. See Campos, supra note 6, at 187.
22. Silver, supra note 3, at 55.
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critiques have a beneficial effect on the system's operation, does not constitute a
compelling argument.23 Further, Silver fails to provide any evidence for the ben-
eficial effect that these critiques have.
Beyond this, Silver sets up and knocks down a rhetorical straw man in the
form of the assumption that we need, as of this writing, no less than 201 ABA-
accredited law school faculties enjoying both the protections of tenure and the
protection of light teaching loads in order to produce the important social bene-
fits generated by the publication requirements at contemporary American law
schools. Tamanaha argues that while some law schools ought to continue in
something like their present form, some others should not, given the gains that
could be realized from producing somewhat less legal scholarship in exchange for
somewhat lower attendance costs. 24 Instead of engaging with this modest pro-
posal, Silver conjures up a world in which all law faculty are untenured and have
the high teaching loads that were standard among law faculty a generation ago.25
III. Two TIERS OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE SOCRATIC
METHOD
Silver then turns from the more general, societal benefits of law review arti-
cle publication to what he calls "the needs of students and clients. '26 Tamanaha's
suggested reforms would result, Silver says, in a stratified system of legal educa-
tion with Ritz-Carlton law schools for a favored few and a Motel 6 education for
their less privileged peers:
Tamanaha touts his "differentiated" legal education, where a handful
of elite law schools remain three-year research institutions and the
rest morph into cut-rate, two-year trade schools, as a means by which
"[p]rospective students will be able to pick the legal education program
they want at a price they can afford." He adds, tellingly, that "[a] law
graduate who wishes to engage in a local practice need not acquire, or
pay for, the same education as a graduate aiming for corporate legal
practice." Law students, in other words, would no longer be able to
23. The claim that legal decisionmakers (let alone other powerfid social actors) are influenced sig-
nificantly by legal scholarship seems so implausible on its face that it is all the more remarkable that
legal academics feel free to make it without any supporting evidence.
24. At no point in Failing Law Schools does Tamanaha specify how many schools he believes ought to
move to a significantly lower-cost model. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1.
25. In the 1970s, teaching loads of five or six classes per year were standard at nonelite schools, while
teaching four classes per year was considered a privilege of faculty at elite institutions. Today, three
classes per year is standard at dozens of nonelite schools, while fimctional two-class per year
teaching schedules have become commonplace. See Campos, supra note 6, at 186.
26. Silver, supra note 3, at 56.
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select freely among the various career paths within the profession after
exposure to the different areas of law in law school. Instead, based on
their ability to pay, they'd either attend a school from which they
might emerge onto Wall Street or one where they'd have no choice
but to hang up a shingle on Main Street.27
I can only imagine the exasperation that reading something like this would elicit
among students at the very large number of law schools where less than one in
ten graduates acquire what would be called "'Wall Street" jobs, even in the loosest
metaphorical sense of that term.2"
Few areas of American life are as hierarchically stratified as the legal profes-
sion in general and the law school component of it in particular. We already
have, in the legal academic world, Ritz-Carltons and Motel 6s and many ex-
quisitely calibrated gradations in between. But there is an important differ-
ence between hotel and law school pricing: If a room at the real Ritz-Carlton
costs $300 per night, a room at the Motel 6 does not cost $270. That, however,
is the pricing structure of law schools. An unranked law school with terrible em-
ployment outcomes often costs nearly as much to attend as its elite neighbor that
sends twenty-five times as many graduates to Wall Street law firms.29
Tamanaha's suggested reforms are based on the unexceptionable idea that
something is wrong with a system that allows institutions to get away with
charging luxury prices for what could, only with extreme charity, be described as
cut-rate outcomes. After all, someone who buys a night at a Motel 6 actually gets
a motel room. By contrast, at very large numbers of law schools, an actual majori-
ty of graduates fail to acquire legal jobs, even liberally defined, within nine
months of graduation. What happens to them beyond that period remains
largely unknown. Silver's response, like that of some other defenders of the sta-
tus quo, is that a high-quality legal education is inherently expensive since it
cannot be entrusted to nuts-and-bolts-oriented adjuncts or other insufficiently
academic faculty.3" "The law professor's principal task," Silver writes, "is not to
teach would-be attorneys how to fill out forms, or whether to turn left or right in
27. Id. (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 174).
28. See generally Employment Summary Report for 2011, ABA, http://employmentsummary.
abaquestionnaire.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
29. For example, compare employment results and relative costs for the dasses of 2011 at
Columbia and New York Law School. Columbia sent 267 of 456 graduates to firms of more
than 250 attorneys, while New York Law School sent ten of 515 graduates to such firms.
This year tuition and fees at the two schools are $55,597 and $49,225 respectively. Id.
30. See Erwin Chemerinksy, You Get WTat You Pay for in Legal Education, NAT'L L.J. (July 23, 2012),




the courthouse to find the Registry of Deeds."31 Rather than limiting ourselves
to transmitting mundane practical knowledge, the legal professoriate should be
dedicated to a higher calling:
More than teaching students what to think, the law professor must-
like the old adage about teaching a man to fish so he can feed himself
for a lifetime-teach students how to think. Whether the client is a
corporation whose counsel would've emerged from one of Tamanaha's
elite, three-year programs or an average Joe whose lawyer was herded
through a cut-rate, two-year school, allclients need and deserve a law-
yer who thinks as well as she can.
32
And the best way to teach law students how to think is "the time-honored Socrat-
ic and casebook method of legal instruction, administered by professional educa-
tors," which according to Silver "is a snug fit with the pedagogical needs of future
attorneys. 33
As was the case with his unsupported claims regarding the value of legal
scholarship, Silver provides no evidence for these assertions. I have been a law pro-
fessor twenty-three years, and I confess that I have no idea what those in the acad-
emy mean when they claim law professors teach students how to think Indeed,
while Silver's claims regarding the practical value of legal scholarship and the
pedagogical efficacy of the "time-honored Socratic and casebook method of legal
instruction '34 may be wholly unsupported, they are also familiar to the point of
banality within the self-contained world of the American law school.
Time and again we hear that law school teaches people-and not just any
people but adults who enter law school with at least seventeen years of formal ed-
ucation-how to think. The words of the fictional Professor Kingsfield are
merely a reflection of what was and remains the conventional wisdom about the
educational value of law school: "You teach yourselves the law, but I train your
minds. You come in here with a skull full of mush; you leave thinking like a law-
yer.13' This is the sort of thing that would not, in the words of Duncan Kennedy,
"stand up for a minute in a discussion between equals. 36 Yet, as Silver's essay il
lustrates, legal academics are especially prone to having the kinds of one-way
discussions in which the bald assertion of implausible claims masquerades as
reasoned argument.
31. Silver, supra note 3, at 57.
32. Id
33. Id at 5S.
34. Id.
35. THE PAPER CHASE (20th Century Fox Film Corp. 1973).
36. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40, 46 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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Note too that Silver is so carried away with what he imagines to be the vir-
tues of traditional legal pedagogy that he doesn't notice the contradiction between
his praise of a method focused on supposedly teaching people how to think-as
opposed to teaching them to do the things practicing lawyers do-and his criti-
cism of Tamanaha's (in my view self-evidently correct) claim that "the best way
to learn how to practice law is to actually do it."37 Silver describes this as "no less
a prescription for failure with fledgling lawyers than it would be with heart sur-
geons,"3 even though two paragraphs earlier he derided the idea that a law pro-
fessor's job might be to teach lawyers how to do things lawyers do ("fill out
forms," etc.)." Given his condemnation of learn-by-doing lawyering, it is diffi-
cult to understand how Silver can also believe that the Socratic casebook meth-
od-which countless critics have pointed out teaches law students nothing about
the actual practice of law-is nevertheless "a snug fit with the pedagogical needs
of future attorneys.""
I have not touched on the ahistorical character of Silver's argument. For ex-
ample, in the 1970s teaching loads for law faculty were much higher, salaries
were much lower, law reviews were publishing approximately one-sixth as many
articles as they do now, and not coincidentally tuition at private law schools was a
quarter of what it is today in constant dollars, while resident tuition at almost all
public law schools was essentially nominal.41 If Silver is to be believed, this state
of affairs should have produced a generation of Motel 6-quality attorneys, while
allowing the wielders of power to operate without facing the various trenchant
critiques that otherwise would have been appearing in the nation's law reviews.
Again, does Silver or anyone else have any evidence that either the quality of legal
education or the social value of legal scholarship are substantially higher than
they were a generation ago?
CONCLUSION
I have gone to the trouble of critiquing Silver's attempt to reply to Tama-
naha's criticisms of contemporary legal education because Silver's essay displays
the same characteristic weakness as American legal academic culture: a tendency
to make bold assertions about the value of legal scholarship and the effectiveness
37. Silver, supra note 3, at 58 (quoting TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 172).
38. Id
39. Id. at 57.
40. Id. at 58. The Socratic method has been heavily criticized on pedagogical, practical, and political
grounds. For a good overview, see Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78
NEB. L. REv. 113 (1999).
41. See Campos, supra note 6, at 178, 183-84, 187, 190.
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of law school pedagogy, while at the same time providing no support for these as-
sertions beyond a willingness to repeat self-congratulatory platitudes about who
we are and what we do. Self-congratulatory platitudes, however, do not become
true merely through constant repetition.
